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A Diamond Scheme is Forever Lost:
The Kimberley Process's Deteriorating
Tripartite Structure and its Consequences
for the Scheme's Survival
ANDREW H. WINETROUB*
ABSTRACT
Oversight of the multi-billion dollar global diamond trade involves
state actors, multinational corporations, and sophisticated civil society
groups operating under the umbrella of the Kimberley Process. This
unique tripartite governance structure created an opportunity for the
parties to develop a system in which conflict diamonds could not enter
the stream of commerce, transparency would be institutionalized, and
governments and industry participants would be held to account. Yet, the
successes of the Kimberley Process are increasingly jeopardized by an
overly statist approach that has led to subjugation of the participating
nongovernmental organizations. This note argues that for the Kimberley
Process to regain its legitimacy, it must reform by recommitting to civil
society's central role, increasing transparency within the diamond
industry, and refusing to shield governments from enforcement of its
rules.
INTRODUCTION
The Kimberley Process stands on the precipice of failure. In 2011,
civil society boycotted the annual plenary meeting and Global Witness,
one of two founding nongovernmental organization partners, withdrew
from its central role in the certification scheme. The Kimberley Process
was once lauded for bringing together governments, the diamond
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industry, and civil society to collaboratively tackle the problem of
conflict diamonds. Yet, despite successfully reducing the number of
conflict diamonds in the supply chain, consumers remain unable to
purchase a diamond with certainty that it was not illicitly mined. The
Kimberley Process can regain its legitimacy through reforms that
reengage civil society and allow for meaningful monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms.
I. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS: CREATED TO ELIMINATE DIAMONDS AS A
FUNDING SOURCE FOR REBEL GROUPS IN ORDER TO PROTECT A VIBRANT
DIAMOND TRADE
Diamond exporting and importing governments, the diamond
industry, and civil society groups founded the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (KP) in 2002 at a meeting in Interlaken,
Switzerland.' Following investigations by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) that uncovered the role of diamonds in funding
conflicts in a number of diamond extracting states, the U.N. General
Assembly passed a resolution urging the creation of an international
regime to address the problem. 2 After an initial meeting of all interested
parties in Kimberley, South Africa, the General Assembly supported the
proposed certification scheme for rough diamonds and the KP was
subsequently finalized.3 Thus, the KP came into existence with
widespread international support, in addition to featuring a promising
tripartite governing structure to give civil society a voice in
decision-making.
Conflict diamonds began to draw the international community's
attention in the late 1990s. 4 At that time, the role of diamonds in
financing violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa was becoming
increasingly clear, as rebel groups were laundering the prized resource
in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC).5 Sierra Leone provides just one example of how the
1. See Interlaken Declaration of 5 November 2002 on the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, 1-2 (Nov. 5, 2002),
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/10540/11192/0005_Interlakendeclaration e
n.pdf?version=1.0&t=1327412628000 [hereinafter Interlaken Declaration].
2. See G.A. Res. 55/56, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (Dec. 1, 2000).
3. See Interlaken Declaration, supra note 1, at 1.
4. See Seth A. Malamut, Note, A Band-Aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the
Kimberley Process and Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 25, 29 (2005) (referencing the U.N. Security
Council's recognition of the role of diamonds in producing conflict).
5. See id.; Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and
Evolution of the Blood Diamond Regime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1719 (2010).
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particularly acute role of diamonds is driving the conflict.8 Smuggled
diamonds were the primary funding mechanism for the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) rebels, while the alluvial diamond fields in the east
of the country served as the RUF's base and constituted the conflict's
primary battlefield.7 As a physically small, highly valuable resource,
diamonds were easily transported out of the conflict zone to a diamond
industry serving demanding consumers around the world.8 These
illicitly mined rough diamonds were accepted by the diamond industry
for years during similar conflicts, but practices began to change in 2000
when De Beers, the world's largest diamond company, announced it
would cease trading with groups operating from conflict area mines.9
The diamond industry, finally acknowledging its essential role in
moving rough diamonds from exporting states, could not avoid the
conflict diamond issue as awareness of the conflicts in Africa grew.10 As
governments and civil society groups began to act, so too did the
diamond industry by participating in the creation of the KP and by
creating its own standards through the World Diamond Council
(WDC).11 The industry's internal auditing mechanism is the System of
Warranties, "a voluntary industry scheme which encourages companies
to place a statement on invoices declaring the enclosed diamonds to be
conflict-free." 12 While the industry's participation in the effort to
eradicate conflict diamonds is necessary, diamond companies have a
strong self-interest in protecting the reputation of their product. Rather
than seeking to ban the diamond trade, the KP buttresses the market
with its internal controls to allow the seventy-two billion dollars in
annual diamond sales to continue.18
The KP was founded to protect the diamond trade from
conflict-producing rebel groups that were seen as the primary threat to
6. See Margo Kaplan, Note, Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace Through the
Diamond Trade, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 559, 566-68 (2003).
7. Id. at 567-68.
8. See Malamut, supra note 4, at 27-28.
9. Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO
Obligations, and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 32 & n.255 (2003).
10. See About WDC: History, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.worlddiamond
council.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (describing the establishment of the WDC in an
effort to increase industry involvement in the conflict diamond issue).
11. See id.
12. The Diamond Industry, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/
conflict/conflict-diamonds/diamond-industry (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
13. See WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, THE DIAMoND INDUSTRY FACT SHEET 1 (2008),
available at http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/Fact%20
Sheet%20(The%2ODiamond%20Industry).pdf.
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an exclusively conflict-free diamond market.'4 The objective was
sufficiently broad to bring governments, the industry, and civil society
together under the umbrella belief that "urgent international action is
imperative to prevent the problem of conflict diamonds from negatively
affecting the trade in legitimate diamonds, which makes a critical
contribution to the economies of many of the producing, processing,
exporting, and importing states, especially developing states."15 As such,
the KP can be seen as an attempt to address a specific resource curse by
eliminating the deleterious effects of conflict diamonds on member
states and, instead, channeling funds into legitimate state accounts.16
Reversing the natural resources trap that has engulfed a number of
diamond exporting states is much needed for their development, but the
KP must be reformed if it is to fulfill that vital mission.' 7
II. THE KP OPERATES LARGELY AS A SYSTEM OF DOMESTIC LAWS, WITH
THE DIAMOND INDUSTRY AND CIVIL SOCIETY BOTH PARTICIPATING AS
OFFICIAL OBSERVERS
At its founding, the KP offered the international community an
opportunity to create an institution that would serve the interests of
populations who have long suffered as a result of diamond extraction
and trade. Yet, from the beginning, the concerns of member
governments have dominated the legal regime, including control of the
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.' 8 Despite the potential for an
inclusive organization with broad participation, states and the industry
are threatening the KP's legitimacy by failing to adequately address
diamonds that continue to fund violence and human rights abuses, as
exhibited by the Marange diamond fields case in Zimbabwe that led to
Global Witness's departure from the KP.19
14. See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, at 1, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/10540/11192/KPCS%2OCore%20Document?v
ersion=1.0&t=1331826363000 [hereinafter KPCS].
15. Id.
16. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 1728 (outlining international efforts to limit access to
the disputed resources and only allow legitimate goods to reach the marketplace).
17. See generally PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES
ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007) (arguing, inter alia, that the
natural resources trap is one of four development traps that are preventing the poorest
countries from producing the economic growth seen in much of the developing world).
18. See Shannon K. Murphy, Clouded Diamonds: Without Binding Arbitration and
More Sophisticated Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, The Kimberley Process Will
Ultimately Fail in Ending Conflicts Fueled by Blood Diamonds, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
207, 220-21 (2011).
19. See The Kimberley Process, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/cam
paigns/conflict/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process (last visited Nov. 16, 2011); Press
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The KP is open to all U.N. member states to join as Participants,
while the diamond industry and civil society organizations act as official
observers. 20 Once admitted to the KP, Participants are mandated to
"amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and
enforce the Certification Scheme and to maintain dissuasive and
proportional penalties for transgressions." 21 Additionally, the KP
requires governments "to certify the origin of rough diamonds, and put
in place effective [internal] controls to prevent conflict stones from
entering the supply chain."22 Participants can trade rough diamonds
only with other member states, thus seeking to close the regulatory loop
while incentivizing countries that wish to produce, trade, or process
uncut diamonds to join.23 Further obligations on participants include
utilizing tamper resistant containers, requiring each shipment of rough
diamonds to be accompanied by a validated KP certificate, designating
official import and export authorities, and collecting and maintaining
relevant data on production, exports, and imports. 24
The KP also establishes specific principles for transparency and
cooperation that Participants agree to support in collecting and sharing
information. 25 The nonbinding statistical requirements are typical of the
KP in stating, "Participants should . . . compile and make available to
all other Participants through the Chair statistical data."26 States are
also afforded broad discretion in determining national methodologies for
data collection and in "[protecting] commercially sensitive
information."27 Nevertheless, through the KP information sharing
mechanisms, states disseminate their relevant laws, regulations, and
practices; their statistical data on rough diamond imports, exports, and
number of certificates issued; and their self-assessments in order to
establish best practices. 28 Information and procedures are also to be
shared through the KP peer review mechanism, in which
Release, Global Witness, Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process, Calls for Diamond
Trade to Be Held Accountable (Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/
sites/default/files/library[KPexity.pdf. See generally P'SHIP AFR. CAN., REAP WHAT You
Sow: GREED AND CORRUPTION IN ZIMBABWE'S MARANGE DIAMOND FIELDS (2012), available
at http://www.pacweb.org/images/PUBLICATIONS/ConflictDiamondsand.KP/ReapVh
atYouSow-eng-Nov2012.pdf (discussing in depth the controversy surrounding
Zimbabwe's Marange diamond fields).
20. Wexler, supra note 5, at 1743-44.
21. KPCS, supra note 14, at 7.
22. The Kimberley Process, supra note 19.
23. Id.
24. KPCS, supra note 14, at 6-7.
25. See id. at 8.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 16.
28. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 1745.
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representatives from member states, the diamond industry, and NGOs
visit individual states and report their findings. 29
In addition to the requirements of Participants, the diamond
industry's "voluntary self-regulation" is also included in the KP texts. 30
The industry created a regulatory entity, the WDC, both to direct the
industry's efforts to eliminate conflict diamonds from the market and to
represent its interests within the KP.31 The System of Warranties
established by the WDC attempts to fill the significant regulatory gap
on the back end of the KP, which covers only rough, uncut diamonds. 32
As such, the System of Warranties encourages companies to include a
statement on invoices declaring the enclosed finished diamonds to be
conflict-free. 33 Also, the WDC prohibits members from knowingly buying
or selling diamonds from noncompliant KP sources, and commits to
punishing and publishing violators of the internal controls.34 For
consumers who purchase a diamond that includes a System of
Warranties statement, the polished stone will have received
certification of its conflict-free status from the exporting and importing
governments in addition to the industry itself. The system is widely
adopted by diamond companies despite being voluntary, yet NGOs have
shown verification and auditing mechanisms to be insufficient.35
From the outset, Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada
(PAC), two leading NGOs on resource extraction issues, have played a
significant role as civil society's official observers to the KP.36 The
emergence of conflict diamonds as a global issue can be traced largely to
29. Id. See also Kimberley Process, Administrative Decision: KPCS Peer Review
System, Nov. 2006, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/10540/11188
/2007%20-%20AD16%20Peer%20Review%20revised.pdf [hereinafter KPCS Peer Review
System] (outlining the provisions and processes governing the KP Peer Review system).
30. KPCS, supra note 14, at 2.
31. See About WDC: Mission Statement, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.world
diamondcouncil.org/index.php/about-wdc/mission-statement (last visited Mar. 12, 2013)
(describing the roles and objectives of the WDC).
32. See The Diamond Industry, supra note 12.
33. Id.
34. WORLD FEDERATION OF DIAMOND BOURSES, RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
24-25 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.wfdb.com/PDFs/Statutes/Resolutions&Recom
mendations.pdf.
35. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Conflict Diamonds: Jewellers Keeping Consumers in
the Dark (Oct. 18, 2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL30/038/
2004/en (revealing study according to which leading diamond companies were failing to
provide consumers with meaningful assurances that diamonds were conflict-free).
36. KP Basics, KIMBERLY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-
process/kp-basics (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
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a Global Witness report published in 1998.37 Other civil society groups,
along with governments and the diamond industry, responded to the
report by acknowledging the problem and pledging to address it.38
Together, the two observer organizations, along with a number of other
groups, provided the KP with needed on-the-ground expertise and
monitoring capacity during its creation and development. 39 Importantly,
NGO criticism of the KP helped lead to the creation of the Monitoring
Working Group, a permanent arm of the KP dedicated to assessing
effective implementation by conducting review visits and annual reports
of Participants. 40 Ultimately, this strengthened the peer review
mechanism and enforcement measures, which led to the voluntary
withdrawal of Venezuela as an active participant in the KP.41 Despite
using its position within the tripartite governing structure to push for
reforms, civil society groups walked out of the June 2011 KP plenary
meeting in Kinshasa, DRC, citing the KP's failure to address human
rights abuses. 42 Currently, civil society, under the auspices of the
Kimberley Process Civil Society Coalition, has a deteriorating
relationship with the KP after boycotting the October-November 2011
plenary meeting and after Global Witness withdrew from its official
observer status in December 2011.43
37. GLOBAL WITNESS, A ROUGH TRADE: THE ROLE OF COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS IN
THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT (1998), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/
files/pdfs/ARough-Trade.pdf; Price, supra note 9, at 32.
38. See The Kimberley Process, supra note 19.
39. See generally Wexler, supra note 5 at 1752-55 (outlining the development of the
KP's internal review system).
40. Monitoring, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley
-process/monitoring (last visited June 22, 2013).
41. Id. at 1752-53.
42. Press Release, Global Witness, Civil Society Expresses Vote of No Confidence in
Conflict Diamond Scheme (June 23, 2011), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/lib
rary/civil-society-expresses-vote-no-confidence-conflict-diamond-scheme.
43. Press Release, Global Witness, Kimberley Process Lets Zimbabwe Off the Hook
(Again) (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/library/kimberley-
process-lets-zimbabwe-hook-again. In response to civil society's boycott, the Plenary's
Final Communiqub stated, "The Plenary reaffirmed its commitment to continue its
constructive engagement with Civil Society in recognition of the role that Civil Society
plays in the KP." KIMBERLEY PROCESS, FINAL COMMINIQUE FROM THE KIMBERLEY
PROCESS PLENARY MEETING 7 (2011), available at http://kp.gjepc.org/pdf/1218 Plenary-20
11_FinalCommunique-en.pdlf.
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III. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS HAS IMPROVED THE ROUGH DIAMOND
TRADE, BUT ITS OVERLY STATIST APPROACH PREVENTS THE FULL
LEVERAGING OF ITS TRIPARTITE GOVERNING STRUCTURE
In assessing the performance of the KP during its first decade, the
successes and the failures are both attributable to the KP's founding
precepts. First, the definition of conflict diamonds, around which much
of the institutional architecture was built, is strikingly limited and
statist. Secondly, voting rights are restricted to participating states and
all decisions must be made by consensus. 44 Thirdly, the legal framework
is thin, comprised mostly of recommendations for state practice instead
of imposing obligations. 45 Finally, the promising tripartite governing
structure is failing to be fully leveraged because civil society's pivotal
monitoring and enforcement role is undermined by the KP's
uncompromising desire to protect a robust consumer market and by
inadequate access to information. This final component will be
discussed in Part IV.
A. The KPApplies a Limited Definition of Conflict Diamonds
The definition of conflict diamond is of paramount importance to the
KP because it establishes the scope of the KP's target. In adopting a
narrow approach to the problem, the KP defines conflict diamonds as
"rough diamonds used by rebel movements . . . to finance conflict aimed
at undermining legitimate governments."46 This statist definition is
derived from U.N. General Assembly Resolution 55/56.47 By categorizing
success as preventing rebel groups from trading illicit diamonds, the KP
strengthens diamond-exporting governments. Throughout the 1990s,
rebel groups were using illicit diamonds to fund violence against
recognized governments, with Angola as a primary example.48
Regardless, the definition's minimizing scope sees the role of diamonds
in fueling conflicts as excessively black-and-white.49 Conflict diamonds
are not simply the product of a system in which illegitimate rebels
44. KPCS, supra note 14, at 4, 9.
45. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 1747-48, 1751.
46. KPCS, supra note 14, at 3.
47. G.A. Res. 55/56, supra note 2, at 1.
48. See generally GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 37 (discussing Angola).
49. See Alexandra R. Harrington, Faceting the Future: The Need For and Proposal of
the Adoption of a Kimberley Process-Styled Legitimacy Certification System for the Global
Gemstone Market, 18 TRANSNATL L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 362 (2009) (arguing that
"the Kimberley Process still has a weak scope of application given the extent to which
states can use diamonds to fund illegal conduct").
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operate against "legitimate governments."50 As a result of this false
premise, the KP makes no exceptions for groups whose principal
purpose is to confront a repressive regime or to combat human rights
abuses.5 '
Such a statist definition may have been necessary to achieve the
stated goal of enabling the "widest possible participation in the
Certification Scheme."5 2 Additionally, the definition is not a product of
governments and the industry alone, as civil society was engaged in the
negotiations on these foundational issues.53 While such valid arguments
can be made for the necessity of this definition of conflict minerals and
for the wide acceptance it garnered, the effects of selecting the funding
of rebel groups as the institution's target still present the KP with
legitimacy issues. 54 If the role of governments is excluded from the
conflict diamond problem, then it becomes imperative to involve civil
society in the process. Otherwise, KP is protecting governments and the
industry is seeing a more secure product, while the conditions endured
by those in the diamond extracting areas are an afterthought.
Progress toward broadening the definition of conflict diamond was
made throughout 2012 as the United States used its term as chair of the
KP to promote the idea.55 Unfortunately, no consensus was reached on
amending the definition at the 2012 plenary meeting, but the final
communiqud encouraged further "discussions and consultations on the
subject of conflict diamond definition."56 Civil society groups have
sought an expanded definition for years,57 but it remains to be seen if
50. See Shannon Raj, Note, Blood Electronics: Congo's Conflict Minerals and the
Legislation that Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 985-87 (2011)
(explaining, with regard to the role of resources in the context of conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, that "one of the common threads among these struggles is that the
various groups involved seek to obtain and sustain power through their control of the
mineral mines").
51. Wexler, supra note 5, at 1730-31.
52. Interlaken Declaration, supra note 1, at 1.
53. Wexler, supra note 5, at 1729-30.
54. See id. at 1730-31 (noting that "the institution does not directly address all
diamond-related abuses; instead, it engages states and corporations by creating a coalition
to address third party abuses").
55. See Milovanovic, A Note from Ambassador Milovanovic, KIMBERLEY PROCESS (Feb.
20, 2012, 4:17 PM), http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-process/blog/-/blogs/a
-note-from-ambassador-milovanovic ("[Wie see diamonds emerging from conflicts that do
not involve the same types of rebel movements, but from broader contexts of conflict, and
we believe the KP should carefully consider how best to address this.").
56. KIMBERLEY PROCESS, FINAL COMMINIQUt FROM THE KIMBERLEY PROCEss PLENARY
MEETING 7 (2012), available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/10540/49668/
2012%2OWashington%20Plenary/o20Communique.pdf.
57. See, e.g., Conflict Diamonds Today, PAC, http://www.pacweb.org/en/conflict-dia
monds-today (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (stating that "PAC has long called for a newer
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the renewed emphasis put on the issue by the United States can
overcome the consensus requirement.
Despite the limitations on the KP imposed by its definition of
conflict diamonds, the KP has been successful at reducing the role of
diamond extraction as a source of funding for conflicts.58 According to
the World Diamond Council, less than 1 percent of rough diamonds
meet the definition of conflict diamonds. 59 While publishing different
statistics than those presented by the WDC, both Global Witness and
PAC recognize that progress has been made under the KP.60 However,
despite agreement on the fundamental improvements seen as a result of
the coordinated effort to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the
market, the differences in quantifying the extent of the progress
provided by the WDC and PAC are distressing. While the WDC claims
that 99 percent of the world's diamonds are conflict-free, PAC suggests
that it remains difficult to quantify what share of annual global
production conflict diamonds represent.6 1 The successes produced by the
KP are significant, 62 including a reduction in conflict diamonds and an
and broader definition of conflict diamonds that reflects the role state actors play in
human rights abuses in diamond zones"). See also Julie Elizabeth Nichols, A Conflict of
Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and Zimbabwe's Marange Diamond Fields, 40 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y. 648, 675 (suggesting that substitution of the word "illicit" for "conflict" in
the definition would remove the KP's approval of exports from the Marange fields in
Zimbabwe).
58. See THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME, THIRD YEAR REVIEW 15
(2006), available at http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/
Kimbeley%20Process%2OThird%20Year%2OReview%20%281-11-2006%29.pdf.
59. WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, CONFLICT DIAMONDS AND THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS
FACT SHEET (2008), available at http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/
documents/Fact%20Sheet%20(Conflict%20Diamonds%20and%20the%20Kimberley%20Pro
cess).pdf.
60. See The Kimberley Process, supra note 19 (stating that "the Kimberley Process has
chalked up some notable achievements in the past ten years"); P'SHIP AFR. CAN.,
DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY: ANNUAL REVIEW 2009, at 2 (2009), available at
http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/annual-reviews-diamonds/AR diamonds_2009-eng.pdf
(claiming that, despite continuing problems, some progress has been made through the
KPCS).
61. Conflict Diamonds Today, supra note 57.
62. Notable successes produced by legitimate diamond revenues can be seen in
Botswana over the course of several decades and in Sierra Leone over the past few years.
Botswana has transformed itself into a middle-income country since it became
independent in 1966, largely through the extraction and export of diamonds. On the other
hand, partially as a result of robust diamond exports, Sierra Leone recently completed an
IMF program that helped it stabilize economic growth and lower inflation. However,
despite these positive effects, over-reliance on diamonds is a significant economic issue
that threatens both countries' ability to sustain their recent improvements. See The World
Factbook: Botswana, CIA (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
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increase in official diamond revenues, but the wide disparity regarding
the degree of those achievements speaks to a pressing problem of
information to be addressed further in Part IV.6 3
B. The KP Decision-Making Mechanisms are Insufficient when Decisive
Action Needs to be Taken
In addition to applying a statist definition of conflict diamonds, the
KP restricts voting rights to participants' governments. 64 Further, all
decisions, from addressing proposals for reform to taking enforcement
actions against participants, must pass a consensus voting system.6 5
Should consensus be impossible, which is quite conceivable given the
fifty participants, the KP calls for the chair to "conduct consultations."66
The decision to mandate consensus voting was made to incentivize
breadth of participation by "acknowledging that state sovereignty
should be fully respected."67 Yet, consensus decision-making has led to
weak enforcement measures and has undermined the KP's deterrence
effect.68 When called on to address the most pressing issues affecting the
certification regime's legitimacy, such as human rights abuses at the
Marange mines in Zimbabwe, the mining of diamonds in prohibited
areas in Cote d'Ivoire, and the continued intransigence of Venezuela,
the KP has produced insufficient solutions.69 With the tripartite
governing regime fractured by the boycott of civil society at the most
recent annual meeting and Global Witness's withdrawal, the consensus
world-factbook/geos/bc.html; The World Factbook: Sierra Leone, CIA (Mar. 26, 2013),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html.
63. See The Kimberley Process, supra note 19.
64. Wexler, supra note 5, at 1750.
65. Id. at 1751.
66. KPCS, supra note 14, at 9. Among the fifty Participants, the European Community
and its member governments count as one Participant. See id. at 4.
67. Id. at 2.
68. See, e.g., DE BEERS FAMILY OF Cos., REPORT TO SOCIETY 2009, at 37 (2010),
available at http://www.debeersgroup.com/ImageVaultFiles/id 1003/cf 5/DBGroupRtS0
9.PDF; The Kimberley Process, supra note 19.
69. See Press Release, Global Witness, supra note 19; Wexler, supra note 5, at 1769-75.
At the 2011 Kinshasa Plenary meeting, the Plenary approved exports from Zimbabwe's
Marange diamond fields over the objections of civil society. Kimberley Process,
Administrative Decision on Marange [Zimbabwe] (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://www.
kimberleyprocess.com/documents/10540/40001/201 1%20-%20AD31%2OMarange%20(Zim
babwe).pdf;jsessionid=6931A9EO7A0C45271682589C3AD02597?version=1.1&t=13275951
70000. The decision allowing Zimbabwe to export diamonds from Marange came two years
after Participants took up the issue of expulsion at the 2009 Plenary, at which time
consensus was blocked by countries such as Russia, South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania, and
the DRC. Wexler, supra note 5, at 1772.
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requirement is an impediment to making the reforms necessary to
strengthening the KP's legitimacy by empowering governments at the
expense of other critical parties. 70
C. The KP Operates Within a Thin Legal Framework that is Dependent
on Domestic Law
As another inducement to broaden participation in the KP, the
designers created a thin legal regime.71 The core documents stress
respect for state sovereignty and impose few specific obligations on
Participants, while intentionally avoiding treaty-like language. 72
However, each government must enact domestic legislation to enforce
the KP in order to be admitted. 73 Thus, while each state retains great
discretion in developing its own legislation and internal controls, all
fifty-four participating jurisdictions now have a body of domestic law
implementing KP provisions. 74 In designing the KP with minimal
international legal requirements, the founding parties lowered the costs
for states to join by reducing the potential for constraints on behavior.75
This has triggered one of the KP's great successes, extending
membership to countries encompassing 99.8 percent of the global
production of rough diamonds.76 Nevertheless, with nearly all the
world's rough diamonds covered by the KP, its inability to effectively
monitor or enforce its provisions is a direct effect of the weak legal
regime in place. Assuming few states will accept a loss of sovereignty by
adopting a more expansive legal framework, it is imperative that civil
society be allowed to augment the KP's monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms within the existing legal structure.
70. In contrast, the World Trade Organization (WTO) uses a "reverse consensus" model
in its dispute settlement process. Thus, when a dispute resolution panel finds a violation
of WTO rules and authorizes sanctions, the ruling will be enforced unless there is
consensus opposing the decision. This model, which takes an approach opposite to that of
the KP, has produced a formidable enforcement regime. See WTO Bodies Involved in the
Dispute Settlement Process, Dispute Settlement System Training Module, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratopgeldispu.eldisp settlementcbt_elc3slpl-e.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2013).
71. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 1747-48.
72. Id. at 1748.
73. KPCS, supra note 14, at 7.
74. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 1748; Participants, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.
kimberleyprocess.com/weblkimberley-process/kp-participants (noting that, of the fifty-four
Participants, the European Union and its member states count as one Participant) (last
visited June 22, 2013).
75. See id. at 1746-47.
76. KP Basics, supra note 36.
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Interested parties have put forward numerous proposals for reform,
with enhanced roles for civil society groups a common theme.77
Arguments for where civil society's particular expertise can be leveraged
to improve the KP's functioning include, but are not limited to, training
customs officials, monitoring compliance, observing fair and objective
decision-making processes, and scrutinizing the industry's performance
under the System of Warranties and related initiatives.78
Implementation of proposals put forward during the chairmanship of
the United States in 2012-calling to broaden the KP's definition of
"conflict diamonds" and to create a permanent secretariat 79-would
further the need for civil society monitoring as diamond-funded violence
by participating governments would fall under the KP's remit and the
independence of KP staff would need to be maintained. Nevertheless,
the legal documents underpinning the KP limit the extent of the
changes currently possible and the reliance on domestic law complicates
implementation of centralized reforms.
IV. THE KP MUST PERMIT CIVIL SOCIETY TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN
MONITORING COMPLIANCE AND IN INSTITUTING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
AGAINST VIOLATORS FOR THE KP TO MAINTAIN ITS LEGITIMACY
Following the departure of one of civil society's two official observers
and the boycott of the Kinshasa plenary meeting, the KP is at risk of
operating largely with only governments and the industry as the
participating parties.80 This structure diminishes the legitimacy of the
KP by removing the component without a financial stake in the
production of rough diamonds. In order to remain a viable international
mechanism, the KP must strengthen the role of civil society to balance
the power placed in member governments and the diamond industry. As
it now stands, the KP is subject to charges of being more amenable to
the interests of Zimbabwe's government, led by Robert Mugabe, than it
is to the concerns of founding partners Global Witness and PAC.81 Both
77. See, e.g., IAN SMILLIE, PADDLES FOR KIMBERLEY: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM (2010),
available at http://www.pacweb.org/images/PUBLICATIONS/ConflictDiamonds-andKP
/Paddlesfor_.Kimberley-June 2010.pdf; Milovanovic, supra note 55.
78. See SMILLIE, supra note 77, at 2.
79. See Milovanovic, supra note 55.
80. See NGOs Walk Out of Kinshasa KP Meeting, Consider Options, OTHER FACETS
(P'ship Afr. Can., Ottowa, Ont.), Aug. 2011, at 1, available at http://www.pacweb.org/Docu
ments/Other-Facets/OF35-eng.pdf.
81. See Charmian Gooch, Why We Are Leaving the Kimberley Process-A Message From
Global Witness Founding Director Charmian Gooch, GLOBAL WITNESS (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/why-we-are-leaving-kimberley-process-message-
global-witness-founding-director-charmian-gooch (stating as a reason for Global Witness's
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the optics of this situation within the international community and the
implications for those in diamond mining communities are weakening a
critically needed system for eliminating diamonds as a funding source
for conflict.
Given the current state of the KP, three areas necessitate giving
more robust powers to the remaining civil society groups, while also
seeking to reengage Global Witness. First, the decision to authorize
diamond exports from Zimbabwe's Marange region has distanced civil
society from established internal enforcement mechanisms. Second,
despite their concerns going unheeded by KP Participants, NGOs retain
significant power to oppose the entry of conflict diamonds into the
market through their ability to influence consumer perceptions. Finally,
greater information sharing is necessary, particularly where the
industry is currently subject only to self-regulation, so that the
tripartite structure can be fully leveraged.
A. Authorizing Exports from the Marange Region Alienated Civil Society
Within the KP
One of the foremost achievements of the KP is bringing mineral
revenues that previously operated outside of state coffers into the
formal economy. 82 Further, diamond companies, principally De Beers,
have become more transparent and pledged to stop purchasing from
groups in conflict zones. 83 From the beginning, it was acknowledged that
the legitimacy of the KP could not rest solely on the industry and
government participation.8 4 Rather, due to the pivotal role played by
NGOs in initially recognizing the problem and in their ability to affect
consumer behavior, civil society had to be given a seat at the table.
Despite intimate involvement in the KP, from its development to the
present, civil society's ability to influence the KP's actions has reached a
nadir.85 If the KP is to avoid further allegations of acting solely in the
interest of increasing revenues, the governments and the industry with
departure from the Scheme, "the decision to endorse unlimited diamond exports from
named companies in the Marange region of Zimbabwe-the scene of mass killings by the
national army-has turned an international conflict prevention mechanism into a cynical
corporate accreditation scheme").
82. See The Kimberley Process, supra note 19.
83. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 1719, 1734-36, 1741, 1744.
84. Cf. id. at 1736 (arguing that skeptics would never find that a coalition of states and
industry alone would establish an adequate mechanism for addressing the human rights
concerns associated with conflict diamonds).
85. See Press Release, Global Witness, supra note 42 (arguing that the KPCS is failing
to meet its core commitments while "[r]espect and support for civil society, as an integral
member of the tripartite structure of the KP, is being eroded").
A DIAMOND SCHEME IS FOREVER LOST
a financial stake in the diamond trade must reemphasize civil society's
position within the organization.
When awareness of the abuses occurring in the Marange fields at
the hands of the Zimbabwean armed forces became widespread in
2009-human rights groups had documented violence and abuse since
2006-the KP took action to prevent exports.8 6 Following a review
mission that concluded Zimbabwe was noncompliant with KP
requirements, the 2009 KP Plenary Meeting established an action plan
with Zimbabwe in which the country agreed to an export ban until
monitors were in place and progress was made.87 By adopting this
course of action, the KP pursued a middle ground weaker than the
suspension advocated by civil society groups and by the review mission's
report.8 8 Further, despite the substantial efforts of civil society to
chronicle the abusive activities of the Zimbabwean government at the
Marange fields, the door was left open for Zimbabwe to quickly return to
the diamond market.
Civil society boycotted the 2011 KP plenary meeting in Kinshasa
because their concerns were realized with the decision to allow exports
from Zimbabwe's Marange diamond fields.89 The decision included
provisions requiring a KP Monitoring Team to verify compliance and
mandating "KP Civil Society Coalition representatives in Zimbabwe will
have access to the Marange area."90 Despite these caveats, the decision
to allow the exportation of diamonds extracted from the Marange region
opens significant revenue streams for the Zimbabwean government in
Harare and diamond companies. 9' This "business deal"92 was made in
contravention of evidence supplied by civil society linking diamonds in
Marange to continued human rights abuses and violence.93 Because of
86. See Nichols, supra note 57, at 668-69.
87. Id. at 669.
88. Zimbabwe, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/confl
ict-diamonds/zimbabwe (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
89. See Press Release, Global Witness, supra note 42.
90. Kimberley Process, supra note 69, at 1.
91. See Zimbabwe, supra note 88 (noting suggestions that the Marange fields "could be
home to one of the world's richest diamond deposits").
92. Press Release, Global Witness, supra note 42 (quoting noted Zimbabwean human
rights activist Farai Maguwu).
93. See generally GLOBAL WITNESS, RETURN OF THE BLOOD DIAMOND: THE DEADLY
RACE TO CONTROL ZIMBABWE'S NEW-FOUND DIAMOND WEALTH 2, 6-8 (2010), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/return of-blooddiamond.pdf (stating
that the Marange diamond fields have been the site of violent assaults, killings, beatings,
rapes, and forced labor at the hands of the government security forces); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE MARANGE DIAMOND
FIELDS OF ZIMBABWE (2009) (stating, at page 3, that Zimbabwe's armed forces "are
engaging in forced labor of children and adults and are torturing and beating local
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the persistent human rights violations committed by the Zimbabwean
armed forces, civil society groups alleged that Zimbabwe did not meet
KP minimum requirements and was in breach of the 2009 agreement to
undertake reforms. 94 Accordingly, NGOs strongly urged the KP not to
authorize the shipment of diamonds from the Marange fields.95
In going directly against the calls of the NGO community, the
Marange decision both jeopardized the legitimacy of the tripartite
structure and too strictly adhered to the limited KP definition of conflict
diamond.96 In addition to presenting substantial evidence of violations
and publicly denouncing the violent actions around Marange, civil
society groups voiced their concerns at official KP fora.97 As such, NGOs
were attempting to wield power within the established KP framework,
while also fulfilling the monitoring function such groups perform for
their broader constituencies. Yet, organizations involved in the KP since
its founding are increasingly being pushed outside its mechanisms.98
Thus, the loss of Global Witness is a paradigm-shifting blow to the KP.9
By acting in the face of mounting proof of diamond-fueled abuses,governments and the industry have put the KP's survival at risk.
B. Civil Society May be Forced to Pursue External Enforcement
Mechanisms
The KP's credibility remains on tenuous ground in 2013 following
the pull out of a vital founding organization and widespread
condemnation of its decision to allow exports from the Marange fields.oo
villagers"); Hilary Andersson, Marange Diamond Field: Zimbabwe Torture Camp
Discovered, BBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011, 1:40 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
14377215.
94. See GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 93, at 4.
95. See id.
96. See Nichols, supra note 57, at 664 (stating that "diamonds from Marange do not fit
comfortably within the KP's codified scope; no rebel group uses these diamonds to fund
war").
97. See KIMBERLEY PROCESS, KIMBERLEY PROCESS PLENARY SESSION: COMMUNIQUt 3(2009), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/133852.pdf.
98. See Press Release, Global Witness, supra note 42 (quoting the president of the
Liberian organization Green Advocates as saying, "KP member governments and thediamond industry seem ready to turn their back on the interests of Zimbabwe's citizens,
the public good and the principles on which the Kimberley Process was founded").
99. See generally Theo Leggett, Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process DiamondScheme, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2011, 11:38 PM), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/busi
ness-16027011 (detailing the problems plaguing the KP leading up to the departure ofGlobal Witness).
100. See Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Diamond Exports Approved over Objections, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/0 6 /25/worldlafrica/25zimbabwe.html?
A DIAMOND SCHEME IS FOREVER LOST
Further, participating governments and the diamond industry are
failing to recognize that a vibrant diamond market is dependent on the
reputation of the product itself.'0 ' Global Witness and PAC became
official observers to the KP, rather than advocates of a complete ban on
the diamond trade, because diamonds can be a source of revenue for
deeply impoverished regions and countries, thus aiding governments
that support human rights, while also reducing conflicts.1 02 Yet, should
the KP fail to enforce its provisions in the face of acknowledged violence,
civil society may be forced to exert its enforcement capacity outside the
KP.
The diamond industry, while strikingly transnational in its supply
chain and financial flows, is uniquely susceptible to alterations in
consumer opinion.' 0 The value. of the product sold by diamond
corporations is founded largely not on its utility, but on an intrinsic
value derived from consumers' perceptions of what a diamond
represents. 0 4 As such, if the image associated with diamonds is human
suffering rather than timeless elegance, the value of the product will
significantly decline. Fears of the effects from such a public campaign
against diamonds are largely responsible for the diamond industry's
initial participation in the KP.105 While it is difficult to disassociate
diamonds from the marital engagement and the wealth they have come
to symbolize throughout much of the world, the fur industry's
significant decline as a result of public distaste for the methods of
production is instructive. 06
Given this market fragility, civil society possesses the power to
affect consumer behavior through messaging that overshadows diamond
marketing, such as De Beers' "A Diamond Is Forever" campaign.107 Yet,
in pursuing a campaign to advocate a consumer boycott due to the
continued role of diamonds in funding conflict, civil society would be
r=l&sp=2&sq=Marange&st=cse (noting objections from the United States, Canada, and
the European Union to the authorization of exports of diamonds mined in the Marange
fields).
101. See Anne E. Andrews, Note, A Diamond Is Forever: De Beers, the Kimberley
Process, and the Efficacy of Public and Corporate Co-Regulatory Initiatives in Securing
Regulatory Compliance, 2 S.C. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 177, 202-03 (2006).
102. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 1737-38.
103. See Ann C. Wallis, Note, Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process for the
United Nations' Development of Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 4
Nw. U. J. INT'L Hum. RTs. 388, 399-400 (2005).
104. Id. at 399.
105. Price, supra note 9, at 32.
106. Id. at 33; see also Karen E. Woody, Diamonds on the Souls of Her Shoes: The
Kimberley Process and the Morality Exception to WTO Restrictions, 22 CONN. J. INT'L L.
335, 343 (2007).
107. See Andrews, supra note 101, at 196-97, 202-03.
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harming the diamond industry as well as its own interests in a
legitimate diamond trade. 108
The KP is in a precarious position following the boycott of civil
society at the Kinshasa plenary meeting. NGOs involved with diamond
trade issues are responsible to their constituents across the globe for
creating a better human rights environment.109 Given that, these
organizations cannot sit by idly while the KP allows diamonds to be
exported from regions where governments have engaged in violence or
enriched individual ministers through smuggling.110 However, civil
society shares an interest in the success of the KP, with full
implementation and further improvements in the certification process
only possible with its participation.111 Taking into account the power
held by civil society to change consumer perceptions of diamonds
through its social capital, it is in the interests of participating
governments and the diamond industry to fully reengage civil society in
the wake of Global Witness's departure. That is an outcome NGOs
should welcome, but accompanying that result must be greater
influence within the KP so that decisions never again can be
characterized as a "business deal."
C. Civil Society Needs Greater Access to Information if the KP is to
Improve its Effectiveness
Should the KP renew its commitment to working with civil society
as a genuine partner in the KP, greater information sharing must follow
so that NGOs can more effectively exercise their monitoring capacity. As
a commodity tracking system, the KP is dependent on accurate and
comprehensive information being provided by the actors most
intimately involved in the production and movement of rough
diamonds. 112 Yet, while the KP does suffer from inadequate
108. Wallis, supra note 103, at 399.
109. See, e.g., About Global Witness, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/abo
ut-us (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
110. See Press Release, Global Witness, supra note 42.
111. See Wallis, supra note 103, at 399; PAC and the Kimberley Process: A History, PAC,
http://www.pacweb.org/en/pac-and-the-kimberly-process (last visited Jan. 03, 2013)
(stating that "the KP is too important to fail, and the prospect of a return to a world in
which such a potentially dangerous commodity is unregulated is not an option").
112. Cf. Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information Flows,
Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3
GOE'TINGEN J. INT'L L. 129, 139 (2011) (summarizing the central idea of information
forcing schemes as "to move information from the entity best situated to hold or obtain
information (the corporation) to the entity most likely to use it for the protection of public
interests (civil society and regulators)").
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information, 113 its problems primarily concern a lack of accountability
after information has been disseminated. 114 Given the state-centric
nature of the certification scheme, it remains possible for conflict
diamonds to be mixed with the legitimate supply chain through
smuggling and processes such as transshipment.115 As such, further
auditing mechanisms will increase the efficacy of the KP by augmenting
the industry and government monitoring efforts already in place, while
simultaneously integrating civil society observers.116
As the KP risks illegitimacy with a collapsing tripartite structure in
the wake of failures epitomized by the inability to stand up to
Zimbabwe, heightened information sharing and transparency become
even more needed. The diamond trade involves numerous states at
various production stages, including being mined across four continents,
sorted in London, dealt in Antwerp, processed in one of thirty countries,
cut in southern Africa or South Asia, and manufactured in Israel. 117 The
KP deserves praise for reducing the presence of conflict diamonds in the
supply chain, but the complexity of the trade's global architecture
requires greater access to industry information." 8 The diamond
industry's System of Warranties is an important part of establishing
mine-to-retailer checks, but auditable information on polished diamonds
must be made available to the industry's partners in the tripartite
structure. 19 Unlike respecting civil society's mandated position in KP
decision-making procedures, which would not require alterations in
existing law, participating governments should use domestic legislation
to pressure the industry into producing information on diamond
113. See CAROLYN T. FRANCIS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, KIMBERLEY PROCESS WORKING
GRP. ON STATISTICS, EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR PUBLIC RELEASE OF KIMBERLEY PROCESS
CERTIFICATION SCHEME DATA (2011), available at https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/
static/pdfs/NotesForKPCSPublicRelease.pdf (stating that "users of [KPCS] data should be
aware that since each Participant reports their [sic] own statistics and that reporting
practices might vary between Participants, the KPCS does not guarantee the quality,
accuracy or consistency of the data presented").
114. See The Diamond Industry, supra note 12.
115. See Woody, supra note 106, at 346 (describing the problem of transshipment, where
diamonds pass through a country in transit prior to arrival at the final destination, with
potential for fraudulent origination claims to arise in countries that loosely monitor goods
that are temporarily passing through their borders).
116. See SMILLIE, supra note 77, at 11-12 (making recommendations for improved
auditing systems).
117. See Price, supra note 9, at 29-30. This list of locations throughout the supply chain
is not comprehensive.
118. See The Diamond Industry, supra note 12.
119. See Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, supra note 35.
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origination beyond the statement of conflict-free status issued by
companies.120
Ultimately, producing a greater volume of information on diamonds
later in the supply chain strengthens the validity of KP certification by
closing a loophole for conflict diamonds to enter the market.
Additionally, governments, with their import and export data, and
NGOs, with their on-the-ground monitoring capacity, would be able to
participate in a part of the KP now left exclusively to industry
self-regulation. Pivotally, moving forward, such information on polished
and finished stones would allow civil society to monitor what companies
are purchasing conflict diamonds from regions such as Marange, should
internal enforcement mechanisms continue to falter.121 By forcing
corporations to provide greater information than merely what is
suggested by the System of Warranties, the KP would move closer to
utilizing the potential for which its tripartite structure was initially
lauded.
CONCLUSION
The KP addresses an issue so critical to diamond-producing
countries and to global consumers that it must not fail. Yet,
participating governments and the industry are taking the KP in a
direction that contravenes the efforts of its civil society observers. By
authorizing the export of diamonds from Zimbabwe's Marange fields
over civil society's boycott in 2011, the KP lost Global Witness's wealth
of expertise and placed its fledgling legitimacy in grave jeopardy. The
KP's overly statist design created structural weaknesses that have
allowed today's problems to emerge. Still, by reintegrating civil society
into the certification scheme and by forcing greater information sharing,
the KP can survive to continue reducing diamonds' role in financing
conflict and other abuses. For the future prospects of a robust diamond
market and of diamond extraction as a development tool, the three
pillars of the tripartite structure must work together to reinvigorate
civil society's status in the KP. Otherwise, the withdrawal of Global
Witness may signal the beginning of the end for a once collaborative and
innovative institution.
120. See, e.g., Ochoa & Keenan, supra note 112, at 131 (describing disclosure
requirements imposed on companies covered by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act as an example of information-forcing legislation).
121. In contrast to the way the KPCS defines conflict diamonds, Global Witness defines
them as "diamonds that are used to fuel violent conflict and human rights abuses."
Conflict Diamonds, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/conflict-diamonds (last
visited April 1, 2013).
